International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE)

Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process

Executive summary
Introduction
Legal framework
Voter registration
Certification of political parties, coalitions and candidates
Voter education and information
Electoral preparations
Equitable access to media
Polling
Vote counting and compilation of results
Pre-election and post-election complaint procedures
General observations
Conclusion
Appendix 1
Appendix 2

Executive summary

With the support of the United Nations and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) was formed in December 2004 to assess Iraq's electoral preparations, offer expertise and informed judgments, and contribute to electoral capacity in the course of Iraq's 2005 election cycle. Comprised of electoral management bodies from a number of nations, the IMIE provided peer-level reviews and advice to the IECI for the January 30 elections. International experts were hired to write an assessment of a predetermined "target area" based on criteria and questions established by the IMIE and relying on a range of information sources, including legal and regulatory documents, interviews with key participants inside and outside Iraq, as well as information provided through the Amman and Baghdad offices.

Overall, the IMIE finds that the IECI prepared and conducted elections that generally met recognized standards of election law, planning and preparations. The January 30, 2005, elections have provided a solid foundation on which to build.

The assessments of the January 30, 2005, elections identify strong aspects of the electoral process, namely, the independence of the IECI, the extent and quality of the IECI's election planning and organization, and the overall integrity of the legal framework under which the elections were held.

The voter registration process was well developed and smoothly conducted, given the security concerns for voters and election staff. It also ensured that essential registration steps and components followed democratic standards. The next electoral events will require time and effort to review and improve the voters lists and to develop an open process so that electors may confirm their registration status and eligibility.

All individuals and groups interested in taking part in the elections were offered the opportunity and means to fulfill the required certification procedures. Although some of the criteria used by the IECI to rule on accreditation applications may be seen as somewhat subjective, the establishment of a general mechanism to submit and resolve complaints and challenges safeguarded the rights of contenders.

While greater time and effort would have been helpful to train education and information officers, the voter education and information campaign was well planned and carried out, despite security, logistical and time constraints.

For future electoral events, it will be important to ensure the existence of a fully independent media monitoring organization, established in conjunction with the IECI and incorporated into its functions, which can provide conclusive evidence of the degree of balance being achieved by the media.

Despite security, political and logistical constraints, the proceedings at the polls were a success. Nonetheless, communication problems between IECI headquarters and the field resulted in inconsistent or conflicting instructions on polling day.

The counting of ballots and compilation of results were conducted professionally and competently, with only minor delays reported. There were, however, reports of interference in the transparency of the process by polling staff.

The regulations provided electoral authorities with adequate powers to impose fines and invalidate fraudulent ballots. However, there was a lack of information about the complaint process and unclear lines of jurisdiction within the IECI over dispute resolution.

Voter turnout was approximately 58 percent – a remarkable feat for elections that were held under severe security conditions in a country with very weak experience of democracy.

Areas for improvement at future electoral events that could be addressed in the short term include:

• consolidating IECI regulations;
• reviewing and improving the register;
• enhancing voter education and information;
• ensuring that independent media monitoring capacity is in place;
• enhancing the training of election officers;
• reviewing candidacy eligibility; and
• enhancing communication between IECI headquarters and the field.

For the longer term, areas for improvement include:

• ensuring transparency in financial contributions and expenditures and their consistency with international standards;
• expanding the register data to include individual addresses; and
• locating all logistical responsibilities, when feasible, inside Iraq.

Introduction

The International Mission for Iraqi Elections was formed in December 2004 to assess Iraq's electoral preparations, offer expertise and informed judgments, and add to electoral capacity as Iraq's three-step electoral process advances through 2005. Comprised of electoral management bodies from a number of nations (see Appendix 1), the IMIE is providing peer-level reviews and advice to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.

On January 30, 2005, the IMIE released its first report, a preliminary assessment of the January 30, 2005, Iraqi elections. The final report picks up from the preliminary assessment and draws on a range of information sources in and around Iraq, including reports by domestic electoral observer groups in Iraq. The report benefited from comments and observations made at the Iraq Electoral Process Technical Debriefing, which was hosted by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division on March 16–19, 2005, in New York City and included members of the IMIE Steering Committee, the IECI and other senior staff, as well as other organizations including IFES, the International Organization for Migration and the European Union.

The report addresses nine target assessment areas:

• legal framework
• voter registration
• certification of political parties, coalitions and candidates
• voter education and information
• electoral preparations
• equitable access to media
• polling
• vote counting and compilation of results
• pre-election and post-election complaint procedures

In addition, a tenth target area was assessed: out-of-country registration and voting. That assessment is covered in a separate report titled Evaluation of the Out-of-Country Voting Program for the January 30, 2005, Iraqi Elections.

The IMIE conducted peer reviews before, during and after the January 30 elections. For each area, an international expert was hired to prepare an assessment report following criteria and questions laid out by the Steering Committee and relying on the legal and regulatory documents developed by the IECI, as well as information provided through the IMIE offices in Amman and Baghdad. The ultimate goal is to build the institutional capacity of the IECI by sharing information and expertise. In this way, the IMIE aims to assist and support the IECI over the longer term while maintaining sufficient distance to evaluate and assess Iraq's electoral process.

The final report highlights the strengths of the January 30 election process and areas for improvement. At the end of each topic area, a list of main recommendations is made for future electoral events. As the IMIE supports the IECI, it will track progress in each area.

Legal framework

The legal framework for Iraqi elections consists of the following:

• Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (also called the Transitional Administrative Law or TAL)
• Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 92, Order Number 96 and Order Number 97
• IECI Rules of Ethics
• IECI Regulations 01–17 (see Appendix 2)
• Codes of conduct (see Appendix 2)
• The National Communications and Media Commission – Code for Media during Elections

In light of the post-conflict situation in Iraq, the framework proposes a detailed agenda and a clear timeline for the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of a permanent government in accordance with international democratic standards.

The legal framework provides for a system of government generally attuned with democratic standards. A clear separation of powers, the main elements of the electoral system, and all aspects of the electoral process are embodied in and further developed by secondary regulations.

All relevant political rights and freedoms were legally guaranteed, including the right to cast a "ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic elections,"^[1] freedoms of speech, movement and demonstration, and the right to run as a candidate, although the minimum candidacy requirements – including being at least 30 years of age and obtaining a minimum level of education – may be considered too stringent when compared to international standards.^[2]

The rules on political party and candidate registration and certification encouraged a broad participation in keeping with standard practices. In itself, the legal framework generally encouraged fair play and open competition. The only notable exception was the interdiction on political candidacy for senior level members of the fallen Ba'ath organization.

The representation formula, based on proportional representation in a single national district, effectively encouraged parliamentary representation of all main contenders. Not only did the TAL explicitly recognize equality before the law for all Iraqis without discrimination, it also sought to achieve gender representation and ensure minimum representation for ethnic minorities in the Kurdistan National Assembly.

The legislative framework provides for a non-partisan electoral commission independent from the executive branch, with full responsibilities for the conduct of elections. Structurally, it comprises a Board of Commissioners with main regulatory, policy and adjudication responsibilities, and an Electoral Administration headed by a Chief Electoral Officer. An external Panel of Judges is established for appeals on the Commission's final decisions. Similarly to other elections in post-conflict scenarios, the electoral authority has a mixed composition of local and international members, the latter, including the Chief Electoral Officer, without voting power. A three-step mechanism for complaints against decisions of the Commission is established, but relevant deadlines for the Commission to respond, in areas like certification of political entities and announcement of results, were generally lacking and should be further defined.

The action of voting itself was regulated in a standard manner. Many provisions were in place to deter fraud, such as the obligation to vote at the polling station where registered, the use of indelible ink and the requirement to produce satisfactory proof of identification at the polls.

The counting procedures established by law respected international standards. However, these procedures did not provide for a copy of the tallies to be handed out to political entity agents. This was apparently due to shortages of electricity and limited office infrastructure, including photocopying capacity. As the physical infrastructure in Iraq improves and stabilizes, consideration should be given to amending this aspect of the electoral regulations to bring it in line with international practice. Depending on the number of parties competing in an electoral event, consideration could also be given to developing a mechanism whereby copies of the tallies are provided to a few credible outside organizations. Similarly, the law does not provide for specific deadlines for the announcement of the total preliminary results and the publication of official results by the electoral commission, seemingly in order to provide maximum flexibility to the IECI. The addition of such a deadline in the future would add to the overall transparency and legitimacy of the counting process.

Both domestic and international electoral observers, in line with international standards, were welcome to scrutinize every aspect of the election under the rules provided by the electoral authority.

With respect to the electoral campaign and the media, the TAL provided a detailed framework regulating political advertising and featuring a National Communication and Media Commission empowered with regulatory and enforcement authorities. All public and private broadcast media had to provide equitable access, presentation and coverage.

The law also included a blackout period on political advertising and information for the last 48 hours of the campaign period until the closing of the polls. The law further imposed a ban on the publication of projected results from public opinion polls and official results during the last 72 hours.

While the law included some aspects of accountability for political entities, such as the obligation to promulgate a statute stating the method for selecting leaders and candidates, the law did not provide a comprehensive framework to ensure transparency and accountability in election financing. Although not uncommon in transitional situations, the absence of regulation for election financing is possibly one of the most salient shortcomings. A comprehensive framework in this area would definitely bring more accountability, transparency and legitimacy to the process. However, at the same time as issuing a legislative and regulatory framework on political financing, it would be important to ensure that the IECI has the capacity to enforce it.

Finally, given the piecemeal approach in which the legislative framework was developed, duplications and redundancies have occurred. The experience of the January 30, 2005, elections also exposed a lack of clarity concerning the limits of responsibility for the different levels of regulations. Given the significant challenges ahead – two more electoral events in a very short time frame – it may be preferable to maintain the current approach of keeping separate the legislation, over which the IECI has no control, and the regulations, over which the IECI has jurisdiction, because it provides greater flexibility for the IECI. However, a general tidying up of the regulations could be undertaken, including the pulling together of regulations 1 through 17 into one single document. This would have the added benefit of making the regulations easier to use, particularly if an index is added.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Consolidate IECI Regulations 01–17 into a single regulatory body.
• Provide for clear deadlines for response to complaints against Board decisions.
• Consider recommending that the requirements for political candidacy be amended to make them equivalent to voter eligibility.
• Develop a legislative and regulatory framework on political financing as well as the capacity to enforce it.
• Consider providing political entity agents or credible outside organizations with a copy of the tallies.

Voter registration

The general registration framework established for the January 30, 2005, elections was successfully developed to suit the needs of Iraq in light of security concerns for voters and election staff. The framework is built with most essential steps and components in terms of democratic standards, including a register of electors, a legislative and regulatory framework promoting democratic rights, the possibility for electors to challenge inclusions and omissions on the lists of electors, and a non-partisan advertising campaign informing electors of the registration procedures. This framework has a strong reusability value and would only require minor adjustments, on the whole, to meet the highest standards.

In mid-2004, the IECI decided to base the Voter Register on the Public Distribution System (PDS) database, which has been used to distribute basic food rations to almost all Iraqis. Quality testing found that the PDS database was sufficiently accurate, while public opinion surveys revealed that Iraqi people generally accepted the PDS as fair and reliable. Considering timing, costs and security issues, the decision to base the register on the PDS was an intelligent approach under the prevailing circumstances and may be seen as a factor conducive to security, confidence and inclusiveness. Voters were automatically registered without the deterrent of having to risk their security (which they were called upon to do at the polls on election day), and the PDS already contained comprehensive data on women and youth. The inclusion of deceased people and people no longer living in Iraq on the list, however, is an issue to be addressed. The database used for the January 30, 2005, elections should now be viewed as having evolved into the Voter Register, distinct from the PDS. In light of time and cost constraints, it is not advisable at this time to create a new register; however, further steps should be taken to evaluate and improve existing records and the capacity for the IECI to register voters.

The registration framework was generally clear and simple, and allowed for the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. The process described in the regulatory and procedural documents provided a broadly inclusive description of eligibility and generally promoted voters' rights. The framework also provided for individual registration data to be actively made available to each family unit. Using at least some public participation to construct a register has been a significant achievement under the prevailing security conditions. This public participation does much towards engendering a sense of citizens' rights for Iraqis.

While it was noted that some members of the IECI held some reservations about the voters lists, indications from the registration period and reported election day experiences, along with the absence of widespread concerns and complaints, suggest that the lists were relatively accurate and generally worked well in practice. Two public opinion polls also tend to corroborate these conclusions.^[3]

A credible registration process depends on active participation by potential voters in reviewing that they are registered and that their registration details are correct. However, a significant proportion of the Iraqi people were not able to participate in such activity. This may be because IECI messaging was not clear enough on this point. It is commendable that, in Ninewa and Anbar, where security measures prevented voters from reviewing preliminary registration data, provision was made for them to register on election day. If procedures for election day registration are still required for future elections, they may also be better issued as a regulation, and could be further clarified.

Overall, the advertising campaign had a good penetration rate (with a 63 percent recall) and was well received (77 percent positive).^[4] The choice of television as the main medium was a strategic approach, given the high penetration of television in Iraq.^[5] Backup to ensure the greatest coverage was provided by radio spots, posters, press advertisements and inserts, and information pamphlets distributed through schools. It is also commendable that the advertising campaign was tied to the registration timetable.

The registration framework could have better integrated a number of key elements, particularly in regard to determination of citizenship qualifications, definition of the documents required to register or amend registration, rules on who determines eligibility and on what basis, and register production. The framework should also protect persons from arbitrary removal from the Voter Register by way of notice, and allow them an opportunity to respond. Plans for the upcoming events should encompass extended revision and address data quality (particularly spelling and language issues). Also, the registration and revision periods should be extended.

Regarding the challenges process, consideration should be given to the right of political entities to lodge challenges. Moreover, the framework did not specify which documents constituted admissible evidence to support or oppose a challenge. It should also provide that manual amendments (both deletions and additions) and election day registration data be collected and processed onto the post-election Voter Register database. The timetable should allow more time for exhibitions and challenges. To facilitate accessibility, challenges should be centralized in voter registration centres, rather than in governorate offices.

One shortcoming was probably the fact that most procedural documentation was not available for review, including for areas such as processing of registration data, register production/distribution, and processing of challenges. The omission of clear instructions on recording and aggregating comprehensive registration and revision data resulted in no publicly visible audit trail assuring the integrity of the voter registration process.

A more systematic approach to collecting, recording and standardizing information, and ensuring better access to this information, would greatly improve the transparency of the process. For future elections, consideration should be given to promoting greater public confidence in the election processes through better national and international distribution of IECI procedural frameworks and policy decisions. Reliable demographic data against which to compare registration data should also be developed and provided.

As long as the security environment remains a central concern, and considering the limited timeline, there seems little option but to update the register developed for the January 2005 elections both for the planned October 2005 referendum and December 2005 elections. Given that no address data are available in the PDS database and Voter Register, the electoral system to be adopted for the National Assembly election scheduled for December 2005 should not involve geographic units of lesser size than governorates.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Maintain current register, but use the coming months to evaluate and improve the existing records.
• Include procedures for election day registration in the regulation, including conditions under which it is permitted.
• Clarify rules to determine voter eligibility and define documents necessary to register or amend registration.
• Extend registration and revision periods and address data quality.
• Consider the right of political entities to lodge challenges and define documents allowable to support or oppose a challenge.
• Develop a mechanism to collect, record and standardize information that also ensures access to this information.

Certification of political parties, coalitions and candidates

The legal framework offered wide guarantees to all individuals and groups interested in taking part in the electoral process and facilitated compliance with the required certification procedures. Although some of the criteria used by the IECI to decide on the accreditation applications may be seen as somewhat subjective, the establishment of a general mechanism to submit and resolve complaints and challenges safeguarded the rights of contenders. The exclusion of certain forces, groups and sectors from the electoral process was the result of deliberate decisions, and not of shortcomings or failures in the legal framework or the established procedures.

Laws and regulations offered registered political entities a wide range of opportunities to run in the elections, and facilitated this process for them. The Electoral Law and the Political Parties and Entities Law were approved in June 2004. Thus, political forces had clear information about the basic rules for their participation seven months before the elections.

In general terms, the requirements to apply for certification seem reasonable and attainable for any group or individual interested in running for election. A special emphasis is placed on renouncing any kind of link to armed groups, prohibiting the use of language or symbols that could incite hatred or violence, and complying with the code of conduct established by the electoral authority. Members of the IECI supported the deposit requirement for certification as a political entity, as the deposit gauges the seriousness of a potential participant and eliminates frivolous candidacies.^[6]

At the same time, it is important to note that the IECI was neither in a position, nor had the capacity, to verify that all candidates effectively complied with the requirements regarding past political affiliations and behaviour. It also seems unlikely that the IECI had sufficient time and resources to verify the political entities' compliance with some of the relevant requirements, such as the observance of provisions established in the statutes for the selection of their leaders and candidates, as well as the inclusion of a minimum number of women on party lists.

According to information provided by the IECI, for the elections of the transitional National Assembly, 256 electoral contenders were certified (223 political entities and 33 coalitions), which presented altogether 648 lists with about 18,900 candidates. For the elections of Kurdistan's National Assembly, 13 lists were registered with 463 candidates.

Criteria used by the electoral authority to adjudicate applications could raise doubts about the impartiality of the process, since they were based on certain discretionary or subjective elements. According to the regulation adopted by the IECI, "An individual or group will be certified as a political entity if the IECI is satisfied that [...] there is no significant deficiency or inaccuracy in the application." (Emphasis added.) However, the regulation itself contains some mechanisms to counteract the apparent degree of subjectivity on the part of the IECI. If the IECI considers that an application does not comply with the requirements for approval, it must send a written communication to the political entity, explaining the reasons for its decision. The political entity is able to reapply for certification, after making the corrections required by the IECI. Additionally, the political entity is able to challenge the final decision of the IECI before the Transitional Electoral Panel. While the IECI advertised the deadline for registration and granted two extensions to the application period, it was noted that more than half of the political entities registered at the last minute. As this was a first-time experience for many participants, the situation should improve over the course of the next few elections. The fact that the IECI extended the period to carry out the certification steps reflected its willingness to offer all possible means for registration to the interested groups or persons.

The number of electoral contenders certified at the national level indicates that the legal framework and the regulations adopted by the IECI fulfilled their function: to pave the way for more plural and competitive elections. It is more difficult to assess the extent to which the legal framework and the established regulations are consolidating the grounds for structuring a solid and competitive political party system. This will only become evident over time.

The main forces and political groups of the Shiite, Kurdish and Turkish-Ottoman communities became involved in the electoral process. This was not the situation for most of the communities and representative groups of the Sunni population, although this was the result of factors outside the control of the IECI.

In general, the number of complaints related to accreditation applications was very minor.

Taking into account that the elections of January 30 were first-time democratic elections, the time for campaigning can be considered short. However, given the adverse security conditions, a few days more or less to carry out campaigns would not have made a substantial difference to the outcome. In light of the security situation, it is difficult to maintain that the electoral contenders were able to freely communicate their opinions and proposals, or that voters were able to make a truly informed choice.

Although the IECI adopted a specific regulation on the electoral campaign, no evidence was found of the imposition of penalties for any breach to the code of conduct for political entities. This suggests that greater attention should be paid to the effectiveness of the penalty procedure.

A mix of civil society groups and international monitors, including political party agents, monitored the certification process. In light of the security conditions, this is a commendable feat, since monitors contribute significantly to a free and fair electoral process.

For future elections, it will also be important to consider the potential implications that may arise from the combination of the chosen electoral system and a mixed system for the postulation of candidacies (party and individual), in terms of both party system structuring and the configuration and functioning of the representation bodies. The IECI may wish to provide expert advice to legislators on this matter.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Clarify the regulations to remove any perception of subjectivity in adjudicating applications.
• Strengthen IECI capacity to verify and enforce compliance with certification requirements.
• Consider providing expert advice to legislators on the implications of allowing both party and individual candidacies within a proportional representation electoral system.

Voter education and information

The IECI is to be credited for recruiting and training staff in election offices, including thousands of registration and polling staff, in a very short time. In each of the 542 electoral offices, an officer was assigned to public information and civic education. However, there was little time to develop their skills as civic educators.

It was wise, given the time and security pressures, for the Public Outreach Department to conduct the voter education and information campaign through the media, with a preference for television. The training video explaining the three simultaneous elections was a very good idea, provided it was released on time and used on all television channels and radio stations. Community leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the field could also use it.

From a technical perspective, it appears that the contracted firms were well guided and instructed by the IECI. However, without any independent media reports from the field, it is not possible to know how the campaign worked in the governorates.

While there were some initial delays in the approval process for public outreach, the IECI should be commended for quick reaction where greater public information efforts were required. Increased public outreach efforts were made in response to the low number of corrections to registrant data and public confusion about the election process and procedures. However, there were complaints about the dissemination of information by the Public Outreach Department.

For the January 30, 2005, elections, the IECI aimed its efforts at instructing voters on how to register and vote. There was, however, a lack of information on the formula to distribute seats in the National Assembly.

A matter for consideration is the fact that the electoral law does not clearly specify that civic education – in addition to voter education – is one of the responsibilities of the IECI. While the Public Information Unit was supposed to include civic education activities, there was no example of a detailed plan to be implemented. The electoral law should be amended specifically to include civic education in the responsibilities of the IECI during the transitional period. Until other State institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Education) take over the important task of informing and educating the Iraqi population on the new contract linking the government to the citizens in a democratic framework, this responsibility should be officially allotted to the IECI, and proper means should be provided to implement the related program. The head of the Public Outreach Department should consider permitting the development of a civic education program, either by creating a new unit under the head's supervision or by enlarging the mandate of the Public Information Unit to include civic education. Input into the messaging should come from a range of actors, including ministries and civil society. There may also be room for the message to be customized at the regional level, as long as the IECI maintains control of the main message.

Given the extreme difficulties of communication and mobility in and outside Baghdad, materials produced by different printers in Baghdad, Amman and Beirut were delivered very late. As a result, virtually no time was left for their distribution or use. Moreover, the civic education handbook will likely become obsolete because the concepts are too immediately linked to the January 30, 2005, elections. In the future, domestic preparation of the material would resolve the timing issue, as would improved communications within IECI headquarters, and between headquarters and the field.

A core group of public information officers were trained in the use of the tools and their targeted audiences. It is not known to what extent this training made its way to the districts; however, it appears that the civic education activities did not always take place or were not as effective as planned, as they may have been left aside for logistical or timeline reasons.

Materials were produced for specific groups of Iraqi society, including women and persons with disabilities, but the actual broadcasting of these materials could not be confirmed. It was also reported that the Kurdish translation of material was of poor quality.

While the nature of information delivery requires the involvement of civil society, collaboration with NGOs and other organizations was not always apparent.

A television spot that aired on local stations, showing some military personnel distributing voter education materials to the Iraqi population, is an example of involvement by other organizations that should be avoided in future electoral events. The use of military forces to deliver material might be necessary because of security issues, however, uniformed troops should not participate in the information effort, especially on television. While the Electoral Administration did not authorize this activity, and had no prior knowledge that it would take place, it may be useful in the future for the IECI to issue explicit instructions that military personnel should not participate in public information campaigns.

For the forthcoming referendum and general election, it would be wise to dedicate additional human and material resources to civic education. With training and a capacity-building program, election workers could conduct civic education activities with the local population. International election experts should assist the IECI in the development of civic education programs, but should not speak on behalf of the IECI lest a perception develops that others besides the IECI are running the election. This would also affect the perceived independence of the IECI. As well, greater support and co-operation is needed for spreading procedural information. A permanent collaboration with domestic organizations, like the Iraqi Election Information Network, under the supervision of the Public Outreach Department should be established.

While the heavy use of television for the January 30, 2005, elections was understandable, a better balance across different media, including radio, print and, in particular, the Internet, should be sought for future events. The IECI Web site should be updated as much as possible, made more user-friendly and interactive, and include easy links.

The broadcasting of debates and forums on television is among the most effective civic education tools and should be put in place in a timely fashion for the forthcoming referendum.

The IECI should ensure ethnic and gender balance within its personnel, materials and programs. The Commission cannot afford criticism on the use and quality of the official languages – including Turkmen and Assyrian – or a lack of cultural sensitivity in its messages. This may require regional communications strategies to reflect different cultures. An indigenous designer who is familiar with the electoral process and the local cultures should be hired for future civic education activities.

It would be worthwhile to assess the impact of the current campaign strategy to find out whether the messages and other material answered the voters' questions. For details on the constitution and referendum, person-to-person activities should be considered more carefully in order to cover the drafting process, the content of the constitution, and the referendum approval formula to help citizens develop their own opinions.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Develop broader civic education materials in addition to voter education materials.
• Strengthen collaboration with Iraqi civil society groups to develop and disseminate materials, particularly at the regional level.
• Balance the use of different media to disseminate information.
• Consider the broadcast of political debates and forums on television.
• Devote greater resources to ensuring ethnic and gender balance in materials and consider adopting regional communications strategies.

Electoral preparations

The planning activities and preparations for the election were extremely well developed. The Operational Plan was well laid out and dealt with the major operational components necessary for a successful electoral event. In comparison to parliamentary campaign periods for other national jurisdictions, six weeks is a reasonable campaign period. It was noted, however, that key dates in the election calendar were difficult to meet and that the calendar should be re-examined. The staffing plan is consistent with international standards and should provide an efficient polling process on election day. Establishing the maximum figure of 500 voters per polling station is in line with acceptable standards.

The training plan was comprehensive, detailing the staffing components, as well as the scheduling, locations and duration of training. If fully implemented, the training should have resulted in polling officials having a thorough command of their duties on election day. It was noted, however, that for the January 30, 2005, elections, there was not enough time to recruit staff and that the timeframe for training was too short. This should be addressed for the forthcoming electoral events.

It was a very practical and strategic decision to use teachers and lawyers as polling officials. In so doing, the IECI benefits by having well educated people representing the Commission at the polling stations who generally have the respect of the population as a whole. Insofar as possible, the IECI is encouraged to use the database of workers developed for the January 30, 2005, elections for staffing at the next electoral events. If additional staff are hired, recruitment should start in a timely manner and provisions be made for increased training.

With vehicle traffic severely restricted on election day, it was also vitally important that polling centres be located in prominent facilities well known to voters and close to voters' residences. In this light, it was a very good idea to use schools for a majority of polling centres. The IECI is to be commended for endeavouring to make the polls as accessible as possible.

The failure to supply, or the late supply of, essential materials for use by polling officials and voters, and poor security in handling of voting materials can have serious consequences for both public perception and the actual integrity of the election and election results. In this regard, the detailed logistical planning and coordination of procurement, including the delivery and retrieval schedules and methods of transportation in conjunction with security planning, was extremely well thought out. There were also detailed plans for the multiple splitting of bulk deliveries into discrete shipments for polling centres within the warehousing logistical plans. Ample steps were taken to mitigate the threat of fraud. It was an enormous logistical effort – 133 flights into Baghdad over 10 days – and should be applauded. Reports of late delivery of some materials were attributed to the tight timeframe, insufficient local capacity and a dangerous environment. Extensions of the registration period for voters and political parties also meant that ballot papers were printed and delivered late. For the next electoral events, consideration should be given, where feasible, to shifting the logistical responsibility to a team inside Iraq.

The plans for the deployment of security personnel were thorough and designed to provide a safe environment for voting. The IECI was invited to provide comments on the security measures proposed by the United Nations. These measures are consistent with standards for elections held in high-risk environments. Although there was no doubt an unprecedented level of security at this election compared with those in other jurisdictions, it was appropriate and, for the most part, successful. For the next electoral events, it may be useful for the IECI and the Iraqi police to develop a partnership to help forge an image that the police are now playing a different role than under the previous regime – they could now be seen as "guardians of democracy." This would require special election training for the police. Information-sharing efforts could also be pursued between the police and the IECI.

The Iraqi people are to be commended for showing such a high level of interest in this election through their participation in important roles such as observers and monitors. It is a clear signal of the people's desire to have free and fair elections.

The fact that voters had two or three ballots to mark and 111 entities from which to choose increased the time that a voter spent in the polling booth, compared with the time required to mark one ballot with fewer choices. With only 10 hours of voting (7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.), some polling centres experienced congestion. To deal with crowded polls, the Commission decided to add more polls rather than extend polling hours. It must be noted, however, that polling hours ended at dusk because of a lack of electricity at many polls and the security context.

It is important to point out that, although the polling and counting procedures and forms had been finalized very early in the election cycle, the Commission was very late to formally adopt Regulation 13/2005 – Polling and Counting in Iraq. It is also important to consider that any delay in adopting a regulation concerning procedural issues could open the door to changes to policies and/or procedures that have already been incorporated into documentation, training and materials procurement contracts. This situation should be avoided at future elections, and new regulations should be passed as expeditiously as possible.

As the IECI moves toward the next electoral events scheduled for 2005, preparations should already be underway. Expertise from international advisors in the field should be sought as soon as possible for that process.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Begin preparations, including staff recruitment and training, as soon as possible (whenever possible, retain staff from January 30, 2005, elections).
• Examine feasibility of moving logistical responsibility inside Iraq.

Equitable access to media

This assessment is based mainly on communications with election and media specialists and broadcasters, both Iraqi and foreign, inside and outside Iraq.^[7] The IMIE was not able to rely on media monitoring organizations to draw its conclusions. The few organizations that were doing such work were unwilling or unable to share their detailed findings.

While democratic media norms were not always fully respected, some coverage of opposition parties and candidates on both state and private media was visible or audible. Government events were excessively covered on the pretext of "government business," but the opposition was not totally excluded. There were a number of appearances by opposition candidates. While none of the people contacted to write this report totally condemned Iraqi media election coverage, in future events this coverage needs to be monitored more closely, and equity in access to media must be enforced.

Many newspapers, television and radio stations claim to be independent but have strong links with political parties. Al Iraqiya (IMN), the state television station, seems to have received pressure from authorities outside the station to cover specific stories. However, some radio and television stations with political connections seem to have given their political opponents an opportunity to buy air time and broadcast their messages.

In 2004, the Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission (NCMC) was set up as the independent media and telecommunications regulatory body in Iraq.^[8] It issued the Interim Broadcasting Programme Code and subsequently the Code for Media during Elections.

The NCMC Code for Media during Elections was published late, which caused difficulties for its implementation and enforcement. There were complaints to the IECI about media bias but, by mid-February, no decision had been made, and the complaints had not been passed on to the NCMC for action. To maintain the integrity of the IECI and the electoral process as a whole, enforcement of media regulations is important.

In addition, the government, in what seemed to be an attempt to gain tighter control of the media by bypassing the NCMC, established a Higher Media Commission. For a time it looked as if it would call into question the NCMC's credibility and authority to enforce its own Code. However, the new body failed to reach an active state, which can be seen as a positive development. There should be no doubt about who has the power to enforce the Code. The only authority that should be able to question the decisions of the NCMC is the IECI, which must ensure that every aspect of the electoral process is fair.

The NCMC Code for Media during Elections will need to be amended and elaborated over time. It will be important to make clear that the kind of care to be taken with balance, fairness and equitable access, while crucial at election time, is also the ongoing foundation of democratic media. In this light, it is necessary to ensure that the definition of the Official Campaign Period does not lead to the belief that balance is not required outside campaign periods. A redrawn code should involve input from the NCMC but also the IECI, the political parties, representatives of civil society and the media. The Code should be signed by all concerned bodies and should be given the widest possible public airing.

The IECI should expect more interest from international media sources for the next electoral events. This will entail broader coverage of the events, which will improve the image of the election for international audiences. The IECI should also expect more media in the field and a greater number of requests for assistance and co-operation.

Training on the management and coverage of an election should be offered to media controllers as well as reporters. The IECI could host workshops. This would give rise to greater professionalism within the media networks. Every station should keep recordings of its election news and programs, as well as a tally of the coverage given to each party, and make them available upon demand. These data will be useful for analysis of trends and tendencies. Every station should have a clear policy on how to respond to complaints and how to rectify any damage done to a complainant.

For future electoral events, it will be important to ensure the presence of a fully independent media monitoring organization that can provide solid evidence of the degree of balance being achieved or not by the media. The organization could be established in conjunction with the IECI and built into its functions. The organization should have skills and resources to implement its mandate. It should also publish its findings on a weekly basis for evaluation. This would raise the awareness of the electorate and the credibility of the whole electoral process.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Clarify respective roles of the IECI and the NCMC in terms of enforcement of the Code for Media during Elections.
• Offer election training workshops to media.
• Establish an independent media monitoring organization to work in conjunction with the IECI.

Polling

Given the unique set of security, political and logistical constraints, the proceedings at the polls were a resounding success. The 58 percent turnout is particularly impressive for elections held under poor security conditions in a country emerging from a generation of authoritarian rule with very weak experience of democracy. The IECI must be commended for its pragmatic decisions in the face of extremely difficult security conditions and for organizing elections in which the polling, counting and reporting processes were satisfactory on the whole. While the low participation rate of the Sunni population is troubling, this was not a factor for which the IECI had responsibility, or over which it had much control or influence. It is to be hoped that efforts to integrate the Sunni population more fully into the new political process in Iraq will prove successful.

The large majority of polling places opened on time and all, including the few that opened late, remained open until the end of the polling process. Even in those reported instances where security issues threatened the closure of polling places, they remained open and the voting process continued. Although security forces adequately protected the polling places, a marginal proportion (0.5 percent) did not open at all due to severe security conditions. According to final figures, 5,216 of the planned 5,244 polling places opened, which amounted to approximately 27,550 polling stations.

For the most part, the polling places were adequately organized to ensure the privacy of voters. The electoral staff seemed knowledgeable enough to provide sufficient information to voters about all aspects of the registration and voting procedures. Time constraints caused some irregularities in the recruitment and training of staff but not enough to compromise the election. In addition, it was reported that some polling staff had partisan interests although it did not seem to influence their behaviour. As for accessibility, the absence of specific provisions for illiterate or sick voters, or voters speaking only minority languages, is a matter to be addressed.

While some flaws and irregularities were observed during the polling process, they did not stem from shortcomings in the legal framework, which was consistent with international standards and struck an appropriate balance between ensuring democratic rights, security, expeditious polling and counting, and maintaining the transparency of the election process. The provisions for armed forces and health officials to vote at any poll, however, should be reconsidered for the next electoral events in light of the potential for abuse.

The effective definition of roles and task assignments for the many officials provided continuing checks and balances for ensuring the overall efficiency and integrity of the polling process. Provisions prescribing the presence, functions and obligations of electoral observers, political entity agents and the media struck an appropriate balance between enhancing the transparency of the election process and ensuring the security and smooth operation of the polling process.

Accredited political entity agents and electoral observers were present in most polling places and could perform their designated functions without interference from IECI staff. However, some reports indicate that IECI staff often did not fully understand the role of these monitors and observers, and either prevented them from entering the polling places, or called them to assist with the voting procedures. Also, some staff at IECI headquarters in Baghdad seemingly did not fully understand the role of accredited foreign electoral observers, and often took actions that hindered or did not support or facilitate their work.

Some reports identified a general problem of communication, both within the IECI headquarters and between headquarters and the field, which resulted in inconsistent or conflicting instructions on election day. Improving the communications infrastructure should be a priority for forthcoming electoral events.

If the use of indelible ink remains a check against duplicate voting for forthcoming electoral events, it may be useful to have the voters cast their ballot before dipping their finger to avoid stained ballots. It was also reported that the ink could be rubbed off with hand lotion or certain types of detergent. While a stain would remain, inexperienced observers and election officials may not have noticed this.

Problems and irregularities that were noted during the polling process resulted typically from a combination of the security conditions, inadequate training of IECI staff, human error and the novelty of, and the resulting unfamiliarity with, complex polling processes. Reported irregularities regarding voter eligibility, and illegal activities or deliberate manipulations by electoral staff and/or political actors, should not be discounted. However, to the extent that such problems occurred randomly through the polling process, they are unlikely to have undermined its integrity or diminished the legitimacy of the election results.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Begin training earlier to ensure greater staff familiarity with all rules and procedures for registration and voting, and inform staff about the roles and rights of electoral observers.
• Reconsider the provision for armed forces and health officials to vote at any poll, in light of the potential for abuse.
• Strengthen and improve communications infrastructure.
• Examine accessibility measures to ensure that sick voters, voters with disabilities, and those speaking minority languages can vote easily.

Vote counting and compilation of results

The counting of ballots and the data entry onto one ballot tally form generally went without problem. By and large, the valid ballots, invalid ballots, unused ballots and so on were properly stored and sealed. As well, the after-the-fact recounting of ballots and the rejection of fraudulent ballots should be deemed a clear success.

The examples provided by the IECI of valid versus invalid ballots were impressively thorough. Compared to international standards, the number of invalid ballots cast was unproblematic. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that polling staff were sometimes unaware of the valid versus invalid ballot criteria.

The electoral observers and party agents seem to have conducted themselves appropriately, that is, there is no evidence of their having caused problems. The deployment of observers could be spread more evenly for the next electoral events, to ensure maximum coverage.

The national Tally Center was highly professional in terms of its mechanics and had very competent staff. However, some problems were reported with respect to observers' access to (or even observation of) the sorting and storing areas.

The official counting records were almost always completed properly (i.e. filling in a number on the correct line) and signed by the required officials. There was more controversy in terms of discrepancies in the correctness or accuracy of the numbers. Observers reported discrepancies during the ballot reconciliation in 15 to 20 percent of monitored cases.

Ballot counting was reported to have started late in some places, although lack of electricity and the security context were contributing factors. There were also reports that the tallying process started late due to repeated checking of the numbers to ensure reliability. In terms of the local counting, frequent problems were reported concerning both intimidation of the counting staff and interruptions to the counting process that caused delays. Despite the thoroughness of the examples provided by the IECI, some polling staff were reported to have been ignorant of the valid versus invalid ballot criteria. As a result, some ballots were not ruled valid or invalid according to the procedures. Difficulties in ballot reconciliation likely arose because some officials were overzealous in wishing to invalidate ballots. It was reported in Najaf that some ballots were purposely rendered invalid by counting staff writing on them.

There were reports that some polling station officials refused to co-operate with the electoral observers. This limited the overall transparency of the counting process. Related to this was the problem of preliminary results not being verbally announced by polling officials as required.

Contrary to Regulation 13/2005, section 7.4, security officials were present inside counting stations and, in some cases, interfered with the counting.

There were some local problems with the tamper evidence bags being used improperly (placed in with the ballots rather than in a separate box to be sent to IECI headquarters) or not being used at all. Also, some ballot boxes were not properly locked.

The reconciliation of all ballots remains a key area for improvement. For example, in Northern Iraq, there were reports of ballot boxes that had been obviously tampered with or stuffed. Specifically, there appear to have been 49 rigged ballot boxes in Ninewa (Mosul), which were sealed with the old seals from the Saddam Hussein regime. Some 10,000 ballots appear to have been stuffed in this way. Far more numerous were the 300 questionable ballot boxes from Erbil containing perhaps 200,000 dubious ballots. (These ballots were investigated at IECI headquarters and rejected, which was a positive final outcome.)

For future events, electoral preparation and observation should focus particularly on the geographic areas, largely in the North (Ninewa, Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulemaniya) but also in Babil, where particular problems arose during the January 30, 2005, elections.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Ensure that ballot counting starts on time, that there are few or no disruptions, and that the presiding officers always stay until the end. More filters and controls should be put in place at polling stations to detect performance inconsistencies.
• Improve communication channels between governorate officers and IECI headquarters to ensure that staff have an accurate picture of what is occurring. This would help verify allegations of fraud and assist in the transmission of results.
• Review and strengthen training procedures for all officials involved in the counting and compilation process, with a particular focus on: reconciling ballots, granting access to observers, preventing third-party intimidation and disruption, and announcing publicly the preliminary results. The "cascade" training technique in general should be reviewed. Reducing the number of tiers to three from four might ensure better consistency.
• Improve observer access to the national Tally Center by providing additional cameras to cover additional areas in the Tally Center.

Pre-election and post-election complaint procedures

On the whole, the process established for complaints seems to have respected the principles of independence and impartiality. The legal framework was sufficiently detailed and generally met international standards. It can be considered an excellent foundation on which to build, and would require only a few adjustments, strengthened resources and improved advertising for the forthcoming events.

The effective handling of electoral complaints requires the existence of clear areas of jurisdiction over dispute resolution, remedial action, penalties, criminal prosecution and appeals. For the January 30, 2005, elections in Iraq, clear lines of jurisdiction for the most part did exist. The IECI Board of Commissioners had authority to adjudicate any dispute related to the electoral process. Its final decisions could be appealed to the Transitional Electoral Panel. The Board could refer criminal matters to the appropriate authorities if it found evidence of criminal misconduct relating to the integrity of the electoral process. At any time prior to the certification of election results, the Board could order a recount of the ballots in a counting centre, or take some other appropriate measure. The Board could also impose sanctions on its staff, political entities, observers and agents, and any other persons it deemed to be within its jurisdiction.

However, one area of jurisdiction was ambiguous: the handling of complaints against the Electoral Administration. According to IECI Regulation 01/2004, section 8.4.1, complaints against the Electoral Administration were to be submitted to the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). The CEO is a non-voting member of the IECI, responsible for the administration of the election. Having complaints against the Electoral Administration directed to the CEO in the first instance might have raised questions about the impartial, independent handling of those complaints.

At the same time, IECI Regulation 15/2005, section 3.1 states that any complaint or dispute related to the "electoral process" could be submitted directly to the Board of Commissioners. Thus it is unclear whether the Electoral Administration referred to in IECI Regulation 01/2004 was subsumed within the "electoral process" referred to in IECI Regulation 15/2005. In practice, the Board made the commendable decision to deal with all complaints in the first instance, including complaints against the Electoral Administration. It made this decision, reportedly, to avoid having the Electoral Administration adjudicate complaints against itself. For future electoral events, it will be important to clarify this legal ambiguity.

Electoral authorities were forced to make a number of hard choices when it came to the disposition of electoral complaints, all of which appear to have been made with great seriousness, resolve and political sensitivity. Regulations provided electoral authorities with adequately wide powers, which were used to impose fines and invalidate thousands of fraudulent ballots, thereby preventing large-scale fraud.

Electoral authorities also took a number of less visible actions that enhanced the operation of the complaint process. Each of these actions went beyond what electoral regulations foresaw or mandated, and should be regarded as significant accomplishments of the IECI.

By allowing the submission of complaints by e-mail, and extending the deadline for complaint submission, electoral authorities made the complaint process fairer than it might have been. The Board successfully prioritized and processed the most serious complaints, which allowed it to certify election results quickly – only 18 days after the elections. This is a commendable achievement. The option to lodge complaints by telephone was dismissed because there is no means to obtain a signature to verify the identity of the complainant. However, complaints could be resolved by telephone.

That said, the complaint process also experienced a number of problems. Despite the laudable decisions of the Board to accept complaints by e-mail, and to extend the submission deadlines, a number of remaining obstacles made it difficult for individuals, political entities and organizations to submit complaints. Among the most important were fears for personal safety, travel and communication difficulties, and lack of information about the complaint process. These obstacles might explain in part why so few complaints were filed.^[9]

The procedures adopted and followed to handle complaints were adequate – with the exception of those relating to public notification of complaint resolutions, right to information, and security of handling and storage – but many were not followed due to inadequate staffing, a lack of staff training, and time constraints. By not always using the full array of enforcement powers at their disposal, particularly for making decisions about candidate eligibility (and decertifying those ineligible), pursuing election law violators, and initiating investigations of observed or reported electoral problems, the authorities missed opportunities to bolster the electoral body's credibility. For future elections, the Board should acquire the human and material resources it needs to adequately exercise its enforcement powers.

For the January 30, 2005, electoral process, there was conflicting information about who was entitled to file complaints and about the deadlines for submitting complaints. The IECI may wish to consider allowing both "aggrieved" persons and witnesses to submit complaints. Accessibility to the process could be increased by publicizing more effectively the deadlines for submitting complaints, and by extending the length of the submission period.

Consistent procedures for the submission of complaints should be developed and publicized. It might also be advisable to increase the number and types of locations where electoral complaints can be filed. The signature of applicants should not be required by regulation. As long as security issues remain, the right to confidentiality should be better advertised, and the acceptance of anonymous complaints should be considered for the forthcoming elections. The procedures should also specify the circumstances under which the IECI has the right to withhold information.

The procedures for appealing the Board's decisions were mostly adequate, but regulations did not delineate clear lines of jurisdiction about how to handle complaints against the Electoral Administration. By assuming responsibility for adjudicating all complaints, the Board avoided putting the Electoral Administration in the awkward position of having to adjudicate complaints against itself.

While the regulations state that "administrative" decisions of the Board cannot be appealed, it is unclear what counts as an administrative decision. Complainants were unevenly informed about their right to appeal Board decisions. Complaint notification procedures should explicitly require all notifications to include such information.

To promote trust and credibility, the IECI may wish to clarify and adhere to its "right to information" procedures, and place a higher priority on making the contents of complaint files accessible to the public and accredited monitors, among others, at the appropriate time. It might also be advisable for the Board to put in place recusal procedures for cases in which the impartiality of individual Board members might be tested or questioned.

The IECI sought to respond to all complaints within three days of receipt at the national office. While timely response is laudable, three days may be overly optimistic given the actual amount of time needed to investigate and act upon complaints. The IECI might thus consider reassessing its time goals for future elections.

Main recommendations to the IECI for the future:

• Clarify and publicize procedures for submission of complaints, including eligibility criteria and deadlines.
• Strengthen and publicize guarantees of confidentiality. Until security situation improves, consider allowing anonymous complaints.
• Clarify meaning of "administrative" decisions.
• Ensure better adherence to IECI's "right to information" procedures, particularly in making information available to accredited election monitors.

General observations

To strengthen the institutional capacity and build on the lessons learned, the IECI should be institutionalized beyond the October referendum and the December elections to provide continuity to the elections management system in Iraq.

In preparing for the forthcoming events, the IECI should consider developing a broad civic education campaign focusing particularly on voter registration and the voting process. Not only would this enable the IECI to take the leadership role in the overall organization and management of democratic elections in Iraq, it would help to increase its exposure and legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi public, and reinforce its position as a proactive player in democracy building.

Conclusion

Assessments of the January 30, 2005, elections highlight strong aspects of the electoral process, including the independence of the IECI, the extent and quality of the IECI's election planning and organization, and the overall integrity of the legal framework under which the election was held.

Areas for improvement for future electoral events that could be addressed in the short term include: consolidating IECI regulations; reviewing and improving the register; enhancing voter education and information; ensuring independent media monitoring capacity is in place; improving training of election officers; reviewing candidacy eligibility; and improving communication between IECI headquarters and the field. For the longer term, areas for improvement include: ensuring transparency in financial contributions and expenditures consistent with international standards; strengthening the register data to include individual addresses; and locating all logistical responsibilities, when feasible, inside Iraq.

The IMIE finds that the IECI has prepared and conducted elections that generally meet recognized standards of election law, planning and preparations. The January 30, 2005, elections have provided a solid foundation on which to build. The recommendations in this report are made with a view to strengthening the capacity of the IECI and assisting it as it prepares for the next electoral events in Iraq. The IMIE remains willing to support the IECI with peer review assessments and advice during the forthcoming events and in the longer term.

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

[1] Article 20(A), TAL.

[2] From an international perspective, standard age limits for the legislature range around 25 years of age; as for education, literacy is the normal requirement.

[3] The information in this analysis comes from a summary of results of the May 2004 Central Statistics Office (CSO) of PDS data, the November 2004 IFES Diagnostic Survey and interviews with election advisors. The CSO survey had 3,000 respondents nationwide. Otherwise, sample size, sample selection methodology and margin of error for these surveys are not known.

[4] Surveys conducted by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies for IFES in the governorates of Baghdad, Basrah, Ninewa and Erbil between November 23 and 29, 2004.

[5] According to the U.S. Department of State, 93 percent of Iraqis reported owning a television. (Audra K. Grant, "Iraq Television Viewership Poll" (Washington: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, October 2003), www.stanhopecentre.org/iraqmediapoll.shtml. Accessed April 20, 2005.) Results are based on face-to-face interviews, conducted between August 25 and September 5, 2003, with 1,444 urban Iraqi adults (18 years old and over) in the cities of Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Basrah, Najaf, Sulemaniya and Erbil. The margin of error for the entire sample (1,444) is ±3 percent, and the margin of error for Baghdad is ±5 percent. The errors for the other individual cities are larger due to the smaller sample size.

[6] An individual seeking certification as a political entity had to pay 2.5 million Iraqi dinars (US$1,713) and a group seeking certification as a political entity had to pay 7.5 million Iraqi dinars (US$5,138). The deposit would be fully reimbursed after the election if the entity received a minimum of 50 percent of the votes required to win a seat.

[7] These organizations include: NCMC (Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission), UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), IWPR (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), the Lincoln Group, the Iraqi Government Communications Directorate, and the Iraqi Human Rights Watch.

[8] Established under Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 65.

[9] For the January 2005 elections, there were 430 complaints registered as of February 19, 20 to 100 of which were pre-election complaints. Of the 430 complaints, 263 were submitted within Iraq, and 167 submitted through the Out-of-Country Voting Program.